In this article, we investigated a Shapley function on the class of crisp bi-cooperative games Firstly, we redefine bi-cooperative games axiom which was introduced by Grabisch and proposed the Shapley function that satisfies the four axioms. Then, the concepts related to a Shapley function have been extended to the case of fuzzy bi-cooperative games by choquet integral. Similarly, we define the four fuzzy Shapley axioms which correspond to four axioms crisp bi-cooperative Shapley, respectively. Finally, for the purpose of bridging the results to a real world problem, we gave a concrete example.
Introduction
The Shapley value [1] - [2] is one of the most appealing solution concepts in cooperative game theory. Butnariu [14] defined a Shapley value and showed the explicit form of the Shapley function on a limited class of fuzzy games. Tsurmmi [5] defined new Shapley axioms and a new class of fuzzy games with Choquet integral form.But this two kinds of Shapley value can only be applied to cooperative games without competition. In fact, when player prepare to invest, there are always more than one economic item for him to choose. In this situation, Butnariu and Tsurmmi's games are not applicable any more. Therefore, Bibao [6] has proposed bi-cooperative games, which can compute relative value for two games at the same time. Ternary voting games of Felsenthal and Machover [7] are a particular case of bi-cooperative games. Also, independently, Greco et al [8] ,have proposed bipolar capacities, where they consider that the characteristic function is a pair of real numbers. Grabisch [9] has also give the Shapley value for crisp bi-cooperative games, but he did not consider the situation in which some players take part in a coalition to a certain extent.
In this paper, we follow Grabisch's axioms of Shapley function and introduce a new class of fuzzy games whose coalition is fuzzy. Moreover, we propose a new explicit Shapley function which is applicable to this new kind of fuzzy bi-cooperative games.
The Shapley value of crisp bi-cooperative games
We consider cooperative games with the set of players N={1,…, n}. We denote the set of all crisp subsets of a crisp set W We say that a bi-capacity is of CPT type [12] if there exist two (normalized)capacities 1 v , 2 v such that 1 2 ( , ) ( . By analogy with the classical case, a bi-capacity is said to be additive if it is of the CPT type with 1 v , 2 v being additive, i.e., it satisfies for
We consider now bi-capacity as games, i.e., the mototonicity assumption (2) of Definition 1 is no more required. As Bilbao at al [6] , we could call such games bi-cooperative games. Let us denote by G(N) the set of all bi-cooperative games on N. For a bi-cooperative game, it can be interpreted like this : ( , ) v S T is the worth of coalition S when T is the opposite coalition, and / N S T ∪ is the set of indifferent (indecisive) players. We call S the defender coalition, and T the defeater coalition. Hence, a bi-cooperative game reduces to an ordinary cooperative game v if it is equivalent to know either the defender coalition S or defeater coalition T, 
We denote the set of all left-carriers (resp.right -carriers)in W for v by CL(W |v) ( resp. CR(W |v)) . 
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is superadditive, the Shalpley value defined by the Formula (1) and (2) (1) and (2) is a payoff function on ( 
The Shapley value of fuzzy bi-cooperative games
A fuzzy coalition of bi-cooperative games is a fuzzy subset of N, which is a vector S={S ( For , ( ) S T F N ∀ ∈ , union, intersection and inclusion of two fuzzy sets are defined as usual,
and q(U) be the cardinality of Q(U). The elements of in Q(U) is in the increasing order as 1
game v C is said to be a fuzzy bi-cooperative game if and only if for any 
, then the following holds: ,
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S(resp.T)is called a fuzzy left(resp.)-carrier for
We denote the set of all fuzzy left-carriers (resp.right-carriers) in U for v C by CL(U|C v )(resp. C v ) ) . Note that the definitions above can be applicable to crisp bi-cooperative games by restricting the domain. Preparatory to the definition of a fuzzy Shapley function, we define the following denotations. Let
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We shall the reverse relationship. From Remark 1, ( )
By using Lemma 2 and the above relationship,
if it satisfies four axioms:
is fuzzy left-carrier and right-carrier respectively, then
Axiom c4 (Additivity): For any two
Note that the definition above is equivalent to Shapley axioms of crisp bi-cooperative games by restricting the fuzzy coalition to crisp coalition.
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Illustrative example

